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February 23, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director, U. S. Information Agency

The enclosed staff studies, prepared by the staff of the President's Committee on Information Activities Abroad, are transmitted herewith for information and such study as you may deem appropriate.

Attention is invited to the fact that the enclosures were not approved by the President's Committee on Information Activities Abroad and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Committee or any member thereof.

Only a limited number of copies of the staff studies were made available for distribution.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Executive Secretary

ER

(EXECUTIVE SECRETARY)

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STATE, NSC, OSD reviews completed

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THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE
ON
INFORMATION ACTIVITIES ABROAD

INTERNATIONAL RADIO AND TELEVISION ACTIVITIES OF
THE U. S. GOVERNMENT

June 20, 1960

*Compilation of draft papers Nos. 1, 3, 5, 14, and 26.

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Note

This document is one of a number of memoranda prepared to assist The President's Committee on Information Activities Abroad in its deliberations. The paper does not necessarily reflect the views of the Committee whose conclusions and recommendations are stated in its report to the President.

In some cases these memoranda have been prepared by members of the Committee Staff; in some cases on our request by persons in various agencies of the Government; and in a few instances by outside consultants.

These papers treat only of matters in which the Committee has had a particular interest. In a number of cases, therefore, they are not rounded and comprehensive treatments of each topic. Nevertheless, we have decided to make them available within the Government with the thought that they may be of some use to operating officials dealing with various aspects of information programs and other foreign activities.

Waldemar A. Nielsen
Executive Director

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INTERNATIONAL RADIO AND TELEVISION ACTIVITIES
OF THE U. S. GOVERNMENT

I. GENERAL STATEMENT

The table of contents indicates the scope of the inquiry with respect to the effect of radio broadcasting and television upon world opinion on which papers were prepared by the Committee Staff or submitted by U.S. Government agency personnel at the Staff's request. These papers have been grouped into this document; each major subject includes summary findings and interim recommendations by the Staff. Some repetition occurs where analysis of facts restates or brings together items appearing in background sections.

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II. POLICY COMMITTEE COORDINATION RECOMMENDATION

In our consideration of U.S. broadcasting activities thus far -- official, unofficial, amateur, military, religious, private and clandestine -- what most impresses members of the Staff is the need for developing the Concept of Orchestration and for strengthening the means of orchestration.

The Radio Broadcasting Policy Committee (RBPC) which already exists can supply this coordination and guidance. It needs to be strengthened and institutionalized. The means available to each agency in support of it will probably require modest expansion. The RBPC would, as a result of our recommendations, be concerned with a broader range of broadcast activities, including all those above cited and in addition, television. (If only in an advisory way with respect to private, amateur and religious broadcasts.) The Radio Broadcasting Policy Committee should be redesignated the Radio and Television Broadcasting Policy Committee (RTBPC). The RTBPC should include military representation.

The RTBPC should be provided sufficient staff, part time or full time, to insure sufficient staffing of the problems which it must consider. The RTBPC should report semiannually to the Operations Coordinating Board.

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III. THE VOICE OF AMERICA

A. Origins

Voice of America began broadcasting February 24, 1942, in German, under the Office of Coordinator of Information. By June of that year, the Office of War Information was created and the Voice became its radio division. In 1945, upon abolition of OWI, the VOA was transferred by Executive Order to the Department of State. The shortwave services of NBC and CBS, which had started several years before the war and remained independent during the war (an OWI censor insured coordination of the two services with VOA) were absorbed by VOA. In January, 1948, with the passage of Public Law 402 (Smith-Mundt Act), the International Information and Educational Exchange Administration (IIEA) was established within the Department of State with the Voice of America as its radio service.

Finally, Reorganization Plan No. 8 of August, 1953, created the U.S. Information Agency as an independent agency, with the Voice of America as its radio arm.

B. Mission

A directive, issued by President Eisenhower through the National Security Council, told the U.S. Information Agency "to submit evidence to peoples of other nations by means of communications techniques that the objectives and policies of the United States are in harmony with and will advance their legitimate aspirations for freedom, progress and peace."

Within this Presidential directive, the general guidelines under which VOA operates are:

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a. While it must, as an official radio, clearly present and explain the policies of the U.S. Government, VOA has an equal obligation to present responsible public discussion of these policies.

b. VOA attempts to present a balanced projection of the American scene, preferring in doing so to reflect American thought and institutions by acting as an observer, neither avoiding nor unduly emphasizing problems which occur in American society.

c. VOA attempts to present accurate, objective and comprehensive news coverage.

VOA seeks to inform, enlighten, stimulate and to persuade. When necessary, it counters hostile and erroneous information about the U.S. and its policies. The emphasis, however, is on the positive character of U.S. objectives and policies in keeping with the President's directive.

C. Targets

While VOA broadcasts in 38 languages (including English), this paper deals only with broadcasts to the USSR and Soviet-dominated areas of East Europe. Many people in these countries are presumably motivated to listen to VOA because it reflects the official U.S. point of view. VOA does not try to reach mass audiences but rather addresses itself to opinion leaders - intelligentsia, upper and middle bureaucracy, youth (especially students), and the higher military.

D. Types of Programs

VOA programming consists of news, commentary and analysis, and special features. An average half-hour is devoted to half news and half commentary and analysis or feature material, (cultural, economic, labor, women's shows, youth shows, book reviews, some agricultural and religious shows, a small

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amount of music, but no programming designed simply for entertainment).

E. Operations

1. Technical. VOA broadcasts world-wide in 38 languages over 87 transmitters (57 at 10 overseas bases, and 30 at 7 U.S. plants) for a total daily direct transmitter time of 505 hours. (The figure does not include transmitter hours from U.S. "feeder" bases since these are intended for the relay bases even though they may be heard in the target area.)

VOA broadcasts to the Soviet and Satellite area account for 223 transmitter hours daily, or 44% of total transmitter hours for direct broadcasting.

VOA broadcasts daily to the Soviet area 15:30 hours of air time, totaling 120:30 daily transmitter hours (originations and repeats): Broken down, these are:

	<u>Daily Air Time</u>	<u>Daily Transmitter Hours</u>
Russian	6:00	57:00
Russian to Asian SSR	1:30	10:30
Armenian	1:00	9:00
Georgian	1:00	8:30
Ukrainian	1:00	7:30
Ukrainian to Asian SSR	:30	3:00
Estonian	1:30	8:00
Latvian	1:30	8:00
Lithuanian	<u>1:30</u>	<u>9:00</u>
Total - Soviet Area	15:30	120:30

To the East European area, VOA broadcasts 11 hours per day air time, totaling 72:30 daily transmitter hours (originations and repeats):

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	<u>Daily Air Time</u>	<u>Daily Transmitter Hours</u>
Albanian	1:30	5:00
Bulgarian	1:45	11:30
Czech-Slovak	2:00	15:30
Hungarian	2:30	17:00
Polish	2:00	14:00
Rumanian	<u>1:15</u>	<u>9:30</u>
Total - East Europe	11:00	72:30

In addition, VOA broadcasts in French, German and English to these areas (or which may be heard in these areas):

English	9:00	27:00
French	:30	1:30
German	<u>:45</u>	<u>1:45</u>
	10:15	30:15

2. Budget. The total operating budget for the Broadcasting Service (VOA) of USIA for the Fiscal Year 1960 is approximately \$17.5 million (excluding Agency overhead and one-time construction costs). Of this amount, approximately \$11.9 million is spent on direct broadcasting in all languages. The cost of direct broadcasting to Communist East Europe is estimated at 35% of the total cost of direct broadcasting, or approximately \$4.2 million, as follows:

Soviet Area (Russian, Armenian, Ukrainian, Georgian, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian)	\$2,345,100
English to Soviet Area	<u>45,100</u>
	\$2,390,200

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Satellite Area (Albanian, Bulgarian, Hungarian, Polish, Rumanian, Czech-Slovak)	\$1,772,700
English to Satellite Area	<u>50,900</u>
	<u>\$1,823,600</u>
Total, Soviet and Satellite	\$4,213,800

An additional \$1.1 million may be applied to this \$4.2 million figure, representing 35% of undistributed VOA overhead costs, including Central Program Services Division which provides news, commentaries and features for use by these area desks.

3. Personnel. VOA employees total 1,576. Of this figure, 171 are directly involved in the production of programs to the Soviet and Satellite areas (84 in the Soviet area and 87 in Satellite area programming). While almost all of these employees are American citizens (only one alien is employed in the Soviet area, and two in the Satellite area) almost all are natives of the areas to which they broadcast.

In order to obtain some general idea of the total number of VOA personnel involved in the production and broadcasting of Soviet and Satellite area programs, however, a pro-rated estimate (even though inexact) may be made from other related broadcasting activities, and general overhead personnel. This would include program direction and policy control offices, Central Program Services such as Talks and News, Overseas Monitors, Relay Base personnel, etc.

By applying the general 35% figure (of total direct broadcasting) additional indirect personnel would amount to roughly 300 employees involved

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in Soviet and Satellite broadcasting.

F. Reception of Broadcasts

Prior to the September, 1959, visit to the U.S. of Premier Khrushchev, VOA broadcasts to the Soviet Area were heavily jammed. (Heavy sustained jamming against VOA programs began in April, 1949.) A certain amount of sporadic, selective jamming has continued since September, but no consistent pattern has emerged. It has varied from language to language, with Georgian and Armenian totally free from jamming till May 26, 1960 when the President's speech was jammed. From the first revelation by Premier Khrushchev of the U-2 incident, and subsequent events, through the period of the collapse of the Summit meetings in Paris, heavy jamming was resumed, though still on a selective basis. This has continued, reaching a peak of total, blanket jamming on May 26, the period of VOA's carrying, in translation, the text of President Eisenhower's address to the nation. Immediately on resumption of the normal programming pattern, heavy selective jamming was once again in force.

During the period of light jamming, the percentage of jamming of Russian language programs dropped to as low as 10% but increased during May 5 through 31 period to as high as 90%.

English broadcasts to the Soviet and Satellite areas remain unjammed, even during periods such as VOA's recent live transmissions, in English, of the UN Security Council debate and President Eisenhower's speech.

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Saturation jamming of VOA broadcasts to the Satellites continues, with the exception of Poland and Albania. Poland stopped jamming in 1956, but the USSR jams Polish programs. Albania has never jammed VOA.

G. Audience Estimate

While accurate audience estimates are extremely difficult to obtain, some information is available. The Office of Research and Intelligence (IRI) of the U.S. Information Agency recently estimated that the VOA audience in the USSR for indigenous language broadcasts may range from one to four million people and the audience within the Satellite area from five to nine million.

It was also estimated that there are between one and two hundred thousand listeners to VOA English programs in the USSR and between two and three hundred thousand listeners in the satellites.

H. Achievements

VOA has received numerous indications of individual listening over and above the regular escapee interviews, such as:

a. Responses to specific broadcasts in letters, either directly to the VOA, or often to individuals who have participated in VOA broadcasts. These letters come from friends or relatives who have heard the broadcasts, or via friends or relatives who are informed of these broadcasts by others.

b. Reports from travelers to these areas who have had occasion to discuss our broadcasts with those who listen, or who, themselves, have heard VOA broadcasts.

c. Surveys conducted among visitors from these areas or participants in special events such as fairs and festivals.

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d. Embassy and Legation reports.

Since the reduction of jamming of VOA broadcasts, and prior to the recent U-2/Summit period, Embassy Moscow has reported a freer attitude among citizens to admit to VOA listening.

However, in any consideration of "effectiveness" in these areas, a variety of sources must be consulted, since any audience assessment is indeed difficult where access to the listener is denied. Thus, in the final analysis, technical measurements become more reliable measures of the ability to penetrate than isolated indications of listening.

A different kind of achievement may be seen in the modest beginnings of local placement of VOA-produced cultural shows. Radio Moscow has just accepted two half-hour shows (Yale choir Russian-language concert and reportage of the National Gallery and Smithsonian). Embassy Moscow was told it would be informed of the exact time of nation-wide broadcasts of these shows. Negotiations are in progress to place VOA tapes on Radio Warsaw and Radio Prague through the National Educational Television and Radio Council. Earlier, Radio Warsaw played a VOA tape on Jerome Robbins' "Ballet USA", submitted through USIS just prior to the appearance of that group in Warsaw.

I. Provisions for Policy Control

Daily guidance, both written and oral, is supplied VOA from the Agency's Office of Plans (IOP) and is, in turn, provided throughout VOA by the Assistant Manager for Policy Application in the Radio Manager's Office.

While a degree of autonomy is allowed foreign language service chiefs

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in the exercise of responsibility for their final product, this is limited by standing instructions that this discretion is to be exercised within certain defined limits:

a. The Central News Branch is the only source of news used by the language services unless special authority is given by either the News Branch or at levels higher than the service chief for the use of other material.

b. Most feature material used by the language services is originated in English by the Central Program Services Division.

c. Morning guidance notes prepared by the Central Policy Office provide initial guidance on the treatment of the day's news. These notes are issued to all supervisory personnel through the service chief level and are discussed at a daily general editorial meeting at the branch and division chief level chaired by the Radio Manager and the Assistant Manager for Policy Application. They are discussed again at subsequent division editorial meetings at the service chief level chaired by the division chief and attended by a representative of the central policy staff. Through the policy application staff, language desks are kept informed of changes during the day. Other less timely policy papers and briefings also provide the service chiefs with policy background.

The exercise of discretion by service chiefs is reviewed on continuing basis by:

a. The supervisory personnel of the branch, the division, and the Office of the Radio Manager, through discussions at editorial meetings, review of daily content reports which list the items and lineage used in actual broadcasts, and review of monitoring reports.

b. The Central Policy Office, through the review by area specialists of the daily content reports and the monitoring reports. The latter reports are prepared by a multi-lingual staff which reports to the Radio Manager and submits reports based on actual listening to broadcasts or reading of air scripts.

c. The Program Review Board, which consists of the Radio Manager and his key staff members and which periodically examines

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complete English translations of output selected at random.

d. USIA posts in the field, through monitoring of foreign language broadcasts (direct listening or, where impossible due to jamming, scrutiny of scripts regularly sent by VOA). The posts transmit comments based on such monitoring.

J. Discussion of Proposed Directive

VOA has long felt the need for a basic document approved at appropriate levels of government establishing the fundamental principles for the content of its broadcasts. Broadcasting policy papers exist for Soviet orbit broadcasts, and VOA receives a full flow of political policy guidance, but there is no basic statement of mission such as that given by the President to USIA in August 1953. Since VOA is a somewhat unique element within the Agency, the President's statement applies only in the broadest terms, to its broadcast operations.

To date, partly because of the lack of a formal statement of its broadcasting mission, VOA has had a varying approach, being at times considered an instrument of truth, and at other times, an instrument of propaganda.

Since 1953, as an outgrowth of the Jackson Committee report, a pragmatic philosophy gradually has developed within VOA, has never been formalized as a guideline to VOA operators. The proposed VOA-prepared directive which follows might help to eliminate the tendency for policy to change with changes of personnel in key positions, and could provide a common base for both State Department and USIA personnel in the formulation of day-to-day judgments.

Proposed Directive to the Voice of America

The long-range interests of the United States are served by communicating directly with the peoples of the world by an official

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radio, the Voice of America. To be effective, the Voice of America must win the attention and respect of listeners. These principles will govern VOA broadcasts:

1. As an official radio, VOA will present the policies of the United States Government clearly and persuasively, VOA will also present responsible discussion and opinion on these policies.

2. VOA will represent America, not any single segment of American society. It will therefore present a balanced and comprehensive projection of significant American thought and institutions.

3. VOA will establish itself as a consistently reliable and authoritative source of news. VOA news will be accurate, objective, and comprehensive.

The directive seeks to resolve the question whether VOA's role is tactical or strategic, informational or propagandistic, immediate or long-range. The philosophy of its authors is that adherence to the objective long-range approach will be the most effective employment of this particular U.S. broadcasting instrument.

VOA states that the proposed directive seeks to establish three points:

1. VOA recognizes its responsibility as an official radio with the specific task of presenting and explaining the policies of the U.S. Government. At the same time, as the voice of America, it has an equal obligation to present responsible American opinion and discussion of these policies. The concept here expressed is based on the desirability of reflecting America as it actually exists and on confidence that an understanding of our democratic processes by overseas audiences is of long-range value to our national objectives.

2. The same philosophy is the basis for the second requirement: an accurate and balanced projection of the American scene. The directive rejects the "showcase" approach in favor of a responsible "mirror" approach. An accurate picture of the American scene will build credibility for VOA and develop foreign understanding of the strength of our institutions and confidence in our system.

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3. The third responsibility for VOA set forth is that of accurate, reliable and comprehensive news reporting. The directive accepts the belief that facts cannot be suppressed, that full awareness of world developments is a gain for American interests, and that full disclosure of our actions and policies will on balance be to our advantage. As the faith and respect of listeners for VOA grow, the content of its programs will have greater acceptance and impact.

As far as the Committee staff is aware, the approach taken is not fundamentally contested in the Executive Branch, although occasionally there have been differences within the Agency, and with various desks in the Department of State on particular broadcasts, which, in an effort to be comprehensive, include material that the desk officers think would be better omitted or treated differently. Among such officials there is some feeling that the VOA as an instrument of U.S. policy cannot be as continuously comprehensive and objective as the VOA statement indicates.

There is also some congressional opinion which holds that VOA overdoes objectivity. On the other hand, in a number of countries, VOA enjoys less credibility than BBC because the latter is considered more objective.

The staff believes that a new directive clarifying the mission of VOA would serve a useful purpose. The inclusion of language permitting discussion of controversial issues and contrary viewpoints in the interest of credibility is desirable.

Such a directive should be issued to VOA by the Director of USIA. Consideration might be given to modifying the proposed Statement by the President as set forth hereinbefore and issuing it as a directive to VOA.

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Proposed Statement by the President

In carrying out its responsibilities in accordance with pertinent statutes and Presidential directives, the United States Information Agency shall be guided by the following:

The purpose of the United States Information Agency shall be to submit evidence to peoples of other nations by means of communication techniques that the objectives and policies of the United States are in harmony with and will advance their legitimate aspirations for freedom, progress, and peace.

The purpose in the paragraph above is to be carried out primarily:

1. By explaining clearly and persuasively to foreign peoples the objectives and policies of the United States Government, including where desirable, discussion of controversial issues and contrary viewpoints.
2. By depicting imaginatively the correlation between United States policies and the legitimate aspirations of other peoples of the world.
3. By unmasking and countering hostile attempts to distort or to frustrate the objectives and policies of the United States.
4. By delineating those important aspects of the life and culture of the people of the United States which facilitate understanding of the policies and objectives of the Government of the United States.
5. Subject to the foregoing the VOA will establish itself as a consistently reliable and authoritative source of news. VOA news will be accurate and objective.

K. Recommendation

This Section III should be transmitted to the Director of USIA.

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IV. ARMED FORCES RADIO AND TELEVISION SERVICE - VOA RELATIONSHIPS

A. Background

The Armed Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS) maintains 204 radio and 33 TV outlets located in overseas areas where U.S. forces are stationed. In general, these stations operate on medium wave bands 15 to 18 hours a day. In addition, AFRTS originates daily short wave broadcasts from New York and Los Angeles utilizing VOA transmitters.

Although these programs are designated for the information, education, and entertainment of U.S. Armed Forces, they have a large "eavesdropping" Free World audience estimated to exceed the million service listeners by a ratio of at least 5 to 1. There are probably some listeners in the curtain countries contiguous to areas in which AFRTS operates.

The Foreign audiences are attracted to AFRTS programs primarily by entertainment programs, but a substantial number also hear news and educational programs. Both VOA and Defense believe foreign reaction to these programs generally has been favorable, although there has been no specific measurement.

Control of AFRTS programs is normally decentralized to the local military commanders in whose area the outlet is found. The local outlets may determine the program content within general Defense Department instructions covering such matters as advertising, the avoidance of conflicts with commercial interests, and the propriety and impartiality of news, political and religious

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programs. No policy guidance is provided concerning the impact of AFRTS programs on foreign audiences. However, a large percentage of AFRTS programs are developed under the direct supervision of the Department of Defense, and screened for possible material which would be inappropriate for foreign audiences. There is currently some use of VOA educational and news programs on AFRTS, primarily at the initiative of local AFRTS stations.

The technical quality of local reception of AFRTS broadcasts usually exceeds that of VOA due primarily to the local broadcast bands available to AFRTS. Although VOA has recently increased its English language broadcasts, the hours of such programs are far fewer than those broadcast by AFRTS in the same areas.

There is some feeling that AFRTS programming should take into greater account the existence of the foreign "eavesdropping" audience. Concern has been expressed that the young and politically inexperienced servicemen who often determine AFRTS program content may not be able to judge possible political implications, and that AFRTS news broadcasts may sometimes conflict in emphasis with those of VOA.

It has been suggested that AFRTS be provided additional policy guidance to increase the effectiveness of programs on foreign audiences and that this guidance be mutually agreed upon between USIA and Defense. VOA has proposed that AFRTS make limited but regular use of certain VOA news programs and an increased use of VOA educational features, on an attributed basis.

Current Defense policy is to design AFRTS programs solely to meet the informational, educational and entertainment requirements of the service

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audience. The Department of Defense recognizes the existence of the foreign audience but believes that if AFRTS programs meet the optimum requirements of the service audience they will at the same time provide suitable programs for the foreign listener. AFRTS is said to achieve a high degree of credibility, in fact, because foreigners believe it represents Americans talking to Americans and not Americans talking to foreigners.

Defense believes that it is preferable not to use VOA news programs over AFRTS since these programs are tailored for foreign audiences. They cite the following points in support of their position:

(a). There is the possibility of Congressional opposition to programs which could be interpreted as "propagandizing U.S. servicemen". (VOA points out that there is also some Congressional concern over "duplication" by AFRTS and VOA.)

(b). Some foreign governments might object if AFRTS appeared to be used to influence the local population. (VOA doubts the validity of this argument.)

(c). Conflicts could arise with U.S. commercial networks and unions. This could be injurious to AFRTS which receives the bulk of its entertainment programs from the networks free of charge. (VOA doubts the validity of this argument.)

(d). Association with VOA might cloud the image of AFRTS as "Americans talking to Americans" and injure the unique credibility which this image provides. (VOA notes that AFRTS is also a Government broadcasting service.)

The basic difference between Defense views and those of VOA appears to be the degree to which limited use of attributed VOA broadcasts on AFRTS would tend to give the impression that AFRTS was attempting to influence foreign audiences. VOA believes it would not give this impression. Defense takes the opposite view.

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B. Conclusions and Recommendations

1. The AFRTS is a major informational asset to the U.S., both because of the scale of its network and its generally favorable effect on foreign audiences.

2. The network must continue to aim essentially at a service audience. Its greatest contribution, not only in its primary mission but also in its effect on foreign listeners, will be to exemplify the very best in American entertainment and public service broadcasting.

3. In order to preserve the AFRTS image of Americans talking to Americans it is desirable to avoid openly identifying AFRTS with VOA. However, some VOA educational programs can be used profitably to supplement current AFRTS program sources and there may be occasions when the use of VOA news broadcasts on AFRTS would be desirable. When such VOA programs are used it is preferable that there be no reference in the broadcast to its origin.

4. Administrative arrangements should be made to assure that responsible military commanders in the field are kept fully advised of current political themes which can serve as guidance for AFRTS news broadcasts. AFRTS officials should be alert to prevent the inclusion of material in their programs which might have an undesirable effect on local foreign audiences.

5. Closer relationships between Defense, USIA and State in Washington and in the field should be established to obtain optimum impact of AFRTS on foreign audiences. A Defense representative should sit on the Radio and Television Broadcasting Policy Committee.

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V. EXAMINATION OF RADIO LIBERTY, RADIO FREE EUROPE, AND RADIO IN THE AMERICAN SECTOR (BERLIN)

A. BACKGROUND

1. - RADIO LIBERTY

a. Origin. Radio Liberty (RL) was established on March 1, 1953 by the American Committee for Liberation, an organization of Americans working in conjunction with a "Political Center" of Soviet emigre groups and organizations. Although the "Political Center" soon broke up, RL continued its operations, establishing additional transmitters in West Germany, and new facilities on Taiwan and in Spain. RL is supported in part by funds raised from the American people, and in part by the Central Intelligence Agency, which controls its operations. Officially, the network is privately owned and operated, and U.S. Government interest is supposedly known only to a few key officials of the American Committee for Liberation.

b. Mission. RL's mission is to promote freedom for the peoples of the Soviet Union and the replacement of the Communist dictatorship, by stimulating and encouraging changes within the Soviet structure through evolutionary rather than revolutionary means. Within this long term mission, RL endeavors to break down the barriers isolating its listeners from the outside world, to strengthen their faith in the eternal values of liberty, to fortify the convictions of those consciously opposed to the regime, and to bring into sharp focus subconscious opposition, to foster doubt and dissatisfaction with existing inequities, and to develop a realization that real and permanent solutions to their problems can be found only in freedom from Communist control and the establishment of institutions of their own choice.¹

Inherent in the project is the concept that Soviet emigres will be utilized in carrying out this mission. Even though the American Committee for Liberation is no longer seeking and sponsoring unification of emigre groups, RL speaks to the Soviet people in the name of free former Soviet citizens and purports to be an emigre station.² While emigres have no policy-making or directional role, they participate in RL operations both as individuals

¹ RL Policy Manual, Nov. 15, 1958, Sec. IA, pp. 1-2.

² CIA summary paper, Radio Liberty - Its Role and Operating Methods, undated, Secret, p. 1.

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and as members of emigre organizations (without specific attribution as such during broadcasts); thus RL is much more closely identified with emigres than is RFE.

c. Targets. RL focuses its main program attention on those groups having greatest opportunity or potential for influencing the future course of the Soviet Union; the government and party bureaucracy, economic managers, the technical elite, intellectuals and students. By providing Soviet citizens with information and views on Soviet and Free World developments which are suppressed or distorted in Soviet media, and by reporting on events which belie official Soviet claims, RL endeavors to stimulate independent and dissident thought among its listeners.

d. Types of Programs. RL's underlying message is that meaningful progress depends on the rights of the individual. It analyzes political and social institutions and intellectual movements in free societies, suggests possible alternatives to the existing Soviet system, and broadcasts the best of traditional thought from Russian and minority group cultures. It does not indulge in wholesale attacks on Soviet leaders or policies, incite to violence, nor engage in polemics or vituperation. While acknowledging (for the sake of propaganda effectiveness) Soviet achievements, it points out the limitations and the heavy human cost of many of them.

A typical RL broadcasting day would provide roughly the following breakdown of its program fare: 20% on political and economic policies within the Soviet Union and the Sino-Soviet bloc; 32% with cultural, scientific and other educational material from everywhere in the world, including such developments in the Sino-Soviet orbit which are not fully or accurately reported in Communist media; the remaining 48% consists of newscasts, press reviews and news features.

e. Operations.

(1) RL operates 9 transmitters in West Germany, 4 on Taiwan (broadcasting to Soviet Asia) and one in Spain, with 4 more under construction. It also operates 7 technical monitoring stations and a news gathering service similar to but smaller than that of RFE.

(2) RL broadcasts about 250 hours daily (1700 hours weekly) in 18 languages. Because of the need to penetrate jamming, its proportion of original programs is lower than is that of RFE.

(3) The budget of the American Committee for Liberation is approximately \$6.5 million, of which RL accounts for 60% or \$4 million. Only a small portion of these funds is raised by voluntary contributions; the great bulk is furnished by CIA.

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f. Reception of Broadcasts. RL broadcasts are extensively jammed, so that on the average, programs are intelligible only 10-20% of the time.³ Despite this, and despite the fact that RL broadcasts do not reach large areas of Soviet Central Asia, it is estimated that 5 to 20% of the people with radios can, if they persist, hear RL broadcasts, and that RL does have an audience of 500,000-1,000,000 people who listen at least once a week.⁴

It is more difficult to judge the influence of this audience and its responsiveness to RL broadcasts. There are some indications that the audience is composed largely of those who are already anti-Communist, or at least strongly skeptical about the system; dedicated party members are less likely to listen or to respond.⁵ While interviews with Soviet visitors to the Brussels Fair (who were largely members of the elite), indicated that 92% listened occasionally to RL or other Western stations, only 9% listened as frequently as once a week. Their typically negative comments on both VOA and RL leave no doubt about their opposition to "anti-Soviet propaganda".⁶ Thus RL reaches a smaller audience (and a different audience) than do BBC or VOA, and may well lose something in appeal and response because of its tone and nature.

g. Achievements. RL's achievements have been generally of two types: announcements of happenings within the Soviet Bloc and timed criticism of the regime. Among the former have been broadcasting news of the anti-Stalin speech by Khrushchev in October 1956, of the ouster of the "anti-Party" group from the Central Committee in July 1957, and of the trial and execution of Nagy and Maler in June 1958. The anniversaries of the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly of 1918, and of the death of Karl Marx, were used as occasions to attack the Communist regime, while the Pasternak affair afforded similar opportunity to spread word concerning the shortcomings of the ruling group in the Soviet Union.

h. Personnel. RL employs about 800 people, the bulk of whom work in West Germany and Spain. As already indicated, while top management and control posts are filled by Americans, most of the RL employees are emigres, who are chosen for their linguistic ability, knowledge of life in the Soviet Union, and professional qualifications. These emigres are particularly useful

3 IRI/USIA, The Impact of Western Broadcasts in the Soviet Bloc, March 1959, Confidential, p. 18

4 Ibid., pp. 24-28.

5 Ibid., p. 29

6 IRI/USIA, The Impact of Western Broadcasts in the Soviet Bloc, March 1959, Confidential, p. 27. For extracts of comments see RL Analysis Report #8-58, Nov. 14, 1958, Appendix B.

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because they can make comparisons of Free World and Communist institutions based on first-hand experiences with both; on the other hand, they may well contribute to the impressions voiced by Soviet visitors to the Brussels Fair of "lack of understanding of present-day Soviet psychology", and of bias, bitterness, and a tendency to "dig up the past".⁷

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Two evaluating panels in Munich and one in New York regularly review as-broadcast scripts for substantive content.

2. RADIO FREE EUROPE

a. Origin. Radio Free Europe was organized in 1949 as the largest operating division of the Free Europe Committee, a nonprofit corporation whose Board of Directors is composed of leading representatives of American political, publishing, broadcasting and business groups. It is supported in part by funds raised from the American people by the Crusade for Freedom and in part by the CIA. The network is officially a privately-owned and operated system, and the support and control of its operations by the U.S. Government is supposedly known only to a few key officials of RFE.

b. Mission. As a major subsidiary of the Free Europe Committee, RFE attempts to contribute to attainment of the following objectives:

(1) Long-term. Complete national independence of the satellite states (Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Romania) and the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) and the establishment by their peoples of representative governments resting on the consent

⁷ RL Analysis Report #8-58, Appendix B, Comments 4,5,7,8,13 & 14.

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of the governed.

(2) Short-term. To bring about a loosening of the ties between the Soviet Union and the regimes governing the nine captive nations named above.

(3) Continuous. To bring about the progressive transfer of power from totalitarian regimes to the peoples themselves by maintaining in the peoples those dissatisfactions with Communist rule which have forced liberalizing changes in the years since Stalin's death and will force further changes until the goal of freedom has been attained.⁸

RFE also endeavors to foster the cultural and economic orientation of the captive peoples away from the Soviet Union and towards the West, and encourages them to look forward to participation in moves toward European integration.⁹

c. Targets. The targets of RFE are the "centers of influence" within each Bloc country, such as party functionaries, intellectuals, journalists, management personnel, youth and student leaders, worker and peasant leaders, etc.¹⁰ It endeavors, in addition to providing basic news and information to the general population, to bring the different sectors of the intelligentsia to a realization that their interests are, in some measure, at variance with those of the top party leadership and conform, in varying degrees, to mass aspirations for national independence, more personal freedom, and a better life spiritually and materially.¹¹

d. Types of Programs. Within the general framework of gradual liberalization, RFE broadcasts are designed to accomplish the following:

(1) Inform the people about happenings throughout the world, especially of those verified events and situations within each audience country which the regime censors or distorts.

(2) Provide insights into the views and policies of the Free World, with special emphasis on the views and activities of the Western coalition and on the principles of human rights and freedom of choice.

⁸ Mission of the Free Europe Committee, April 8, 1958, par. 1.

⁹ Ibid., par. 2a.

¹⁰ Mission of the Free Europe Committee, April 8, 1958, section on Target Priorities, p. 1.

¹¹ Ibid.

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(3) Promote effective liberalization by constructive, selective counter-proposals to the satellite peoples rather than by heavy stress on obvious wrongs.¹²

The backbone of RFE's program schedule is approximately 10 minutes of live news every hour, including news about events within the target countries and other countries of the Soviet Bloc. In addition, there are daily commentaries, special programs for youth, workers, intellectuals, Communist Party members, etc., and cultural programs such as music, drama and entertainment. RFE's special contribution to American broadcasting operations consists of three things:

(1) It provides detailed news of events in the Iron Curtain countries and commentaries on those events.

(2) It provides a great deal of information concerning political, economic and cultural developments in Western Europe, relating these to common European aims and aspirations, including those of the peoples in the East European countries.

(3) It presents material on the arts, the music, the literature and other cultural developments of each country to which it broadcasts.

e. Operations. RFE operates 28 transmitters and relay stations located in West Germany and Portugal, which together are on the air more than 2700 hours a week. Roughly, RFE broadcasts 20 hours daily to Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and 6 hours daily to Rumania and Bulgaria. Programs are broadcast simultaneously over several transmitters in order to circumvent jamming, and at least once daily all transmitters are directed simultaneously to each of the Eastern European countries in a jam-proof technique known as the "saturation service".

RFE maintains, in addition to the broadcast facilities noted, a news and information service with 10 bureaus in principal European countries, a monitoring section which tunes in on more than 50 radio stations and teletype news services behind the Iron Curtain, and a central newsroom which, using material from these and other sources, compiles some 350,000 words of information each day.

The budget of RFE currently averages about 10.2 million dollars, and represents about two-thirds of the total expenditures of the Free Europe

¹² Evaluation of Current FEC Mission, February 18, 1960, p. 11.

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Committee. While no direct breakdown of sources of support is practicable, CIA provides between [] of the funds expended by the Free Europe Committee; on a pro rata basis, it would therefore contribute [] annually toward RFE.

f. Reception of Broadcasts. It is impossible to determine accurately the size and nature of the listening audience in the satellite countries, much less the impact on this audience of broadcasts by RFE. Nevertheless, RFE and interested U.S. agencies have made strenuous efforts to determine both such technical factors as receptivity of signals, and such subjective factors as the nature, size and reaction of the target audience. Measures used have included monitoring from the border areas of RFE broadcasts, reports on radio receptivity by U.S. officials and other travelers within the satellites, correspondence from people in Iron Curtain countries and, above all, interviews with escapees from these countries. While the results of these checks and surveys must be used with caution, there are indications that about 45 to 50% of transmissions (and therefore 80 to 90% of RFE programs, which are repeated three or four times) are received in rural areas, although reception is considerably poorer in and near large cities.¹³ These percentages are of course higher in Poland, where no jamming has taken place since 1956, but jamming from outside Poland still interferes with transmission and reception of RFE programs. From 80 to 90% of escapees and refugees admit listening to RFE, which seems to command a larger audience than either BBC or VOA, and while the number listening has declined since the early high of 1951-52, the percentage of those listening is still remarkable. If the percentage of listeners within the countries corresponds to those registered by the surveys, as Government experts believe, RFE must be reaching millions of people in each of the satellite countries.¹⁴

g. Achievements. From July 4, 1950, when it started broadcasting, until the Polish and Hungarian disturbances of October and November 1956, RFE conducted, among other, the following significant campaigns: dissemination of news on Stalin's illness and death in advance of coverage by the regime stations; a similar "beat" on the East Berlin uprising; broadcasting in 1954 the revelations of the high level Polish Police official and defector, Colonel Swiatlow, thus contributing significantly to the loosening of police control; disseminating the Khrushchev "secret" Party Congress speech; and the coverage and "play back" to the satellite populations of the story of their own struggles against Soviet and Communist tyranny in 1956. Although

¹³ Fourth Annual Conference on U.S. Broadcasting to the Soviet Orbit, 1957, Confidential, pp. 5 and 6.

¹⁴ For a more detailed discussion of this evaluation, and for some of the data on which the conclusion is based, see IRI/USIA, The Impact of Western Broadcasts in the Soviet Bloc, Confidential, Sec. 1.

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during this period RFE openly espoused the cause of the Bloc emigrees, only once was the tone and extent of its broadcasts seriously questioned. At the time of the Hungarian revolts RFE broadcasting was alleged in some quarters to have incited the Hungarians to a hopeless trial at arms; however, a special report by a commission of the Council of Europe's Consultative Assembly had this to say about the charge: "The accusation that RFE promised the Hungarian people during their revolt military aid from the West was proved to be without ground."¹⁵ 25X1

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¹⁵ Report to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe,
April 27, 1957, p. 6.

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3. RADIO IN THE AMERICAN SECTOR (BERLIN)

a. Origin. Radio in the American Sector (RIAS) was created early in 1946 because the USSR, disregarding the Occupation Agreement, refused to allow the French, British, or Americans to use or share the facilities of Radio Berlin, from which the Soviets were broadcasting Communist propaganda. Initially RIAS was operated and directed by the U.S. forces in Germany; however, it was subsequently placed under the control of the U.S. High Commissioner and was, upon the dissolution of that office, transferred to the United States Information Agency. It is funded and operated separately from the Voice of America.

b. Mission. As the name indicates, the original function of RIAS was to broadcast to residents of the American sector of Berlin. With the progressive deterioration of relations with the Soviets, and after acquisition of more powerful transmitters, RIAS shifted its emphasis from the city proper to the Soviet Zone of Germany and its 18,000,000 inhabitants. RIAS broadcasts are concerned with explaining U.S. policy and presenting reliable

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news and factual information about the U.S. and the Free World. A main objective of RIAS is to maintain the morale of the East Germans, oppressed by the Communist regime under which they live, and remind them that they have not been forgotten by the United States and the Free World. Likewise, this station keeps alive the Free World and German culture which the Communist regime seeks to stamp out and replace.

c. Targets. While RIAS has a mass audience, its programs are particularly designed to appeal to youth, farmers and workers, women and intellectuals. News and political commentaries aim at exposing, criticizing (and sometimes satirizing) Communist policies and programs, while special features are designed to keep intellectuals aware of Free World cultural developments, to draw youth away from interest in Communist-organized activities, and to spread knowledge of non-communistic educational theories and techniques.

d. Types of Programs. News and political commentaries are the main types of programs. There are 25 regular daily newscasts, based on wire service reports, plus news gleaned by the RIAS staff in Bonn and also from the Voice of America. Especially significant are news roundups about what is happening in the Soviet Zone itself, based on letters from listeners, Soviet Zone publications, and interviews with visitors and refugees from the Soviet Zone. Political commentaries on events behind the Iron Curtain and on topics such as international conferences, progress towards European integration, and elections in the U.S. are featured, some in narrative form, and others (such as Pinsel and Schnorchel) in the form of skits which satirize life among Soviet Zone officials.

Educational programs, designed for the 10-18 age group, counter distortions in truth presented in Communist schools in the Soviet Zone. The University of the Air series provides an international forum where respected scholars in many fields, and from various countries, deliver lectures which pierce the isolation from Free World thought of men of learning, professors and university students in the Soviet Zone. Other educational programs concern developments in Free World theories of child education, so that parents and teachers can better resist the propaganda of Communist planners, and thus RIAS devotes special interest to this category. Topics are selected for youth programs so as to draw interest away from the regimented political indoctrination of Communist youth groups.

Music programs keep alive among listeners all aspects of Free World and German culture which the Communist regime seeks to stamp out; thus RIAS broadcasts much recorded music, programs from international music festivals, and music by its own dance band, chorus and youth orchestra. Drama is presented in terms of contemporary and classic plays, produced by the drama

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division of RIAS, as well as acquired from West German radio stations for rebroadcast. Entertainment in general is broadcast via quiz shows, serial and dramatic skits, situation comedies. Most outstanding of these is the Insulaner, a political cabaret troupe which has become famous all over Germany, because of its lightheartedness, poking fun at the stupidity, pompousness and corruption of Communist officials and their orders. Other special programs include those for women, parents, and children. Popular science lectures bring the listener up to date in such complex fields as space research and peaceful uses of the atom. Literary broadcasts review current books, commemorate important literary events, and include narration of whole chapters of books which are not available behind the Iron Curtain.

e. Operations. RIAS broadcasts over one long wave, one short wave, two FM and three AM facilities. Six transmitters are located in Berlin, two in Hof, and one in Munich. In addition to using both American wire services (AP and UPI), RIAS has a correspondent in Bonn, and stringers located in leading cities all over the world. Likewise, programs originate in the Voice of America in Washington and are relayed to RIAS. A small number of programs are purchased from West German radio stations for rebroadcast.

RIAS programs cost \$3,360,400 in Fiscal Year 1960 and \$3,387,193 in Fiscal Year 1961. Of the FY 1960 total, \$2,520,000 was allotted from appropriated funds, and the balance from other sources.

f. Reception of Broadcasts. An estimated 600 jamming transmitters in the Soviet Zone of Germany attempt to block the RIAS signal. RIAS gets its message through by having two completely separate programs during peak listening hours and by the use of several different frequencies on all wave bands. Quarterly polls of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) have shown a steady increase of listeners to RIAS, which now regularly number around 65% of the total Soviet Zone population of 18,000,000. (Since RIAS broadcasts are also heard in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary and Yugoslavia, as well as in West Germany, the average daily audience is estimated at 6,000,000.) In their last poll, ICFTU indicated that RIAS rated 72%, Radio Free Berlin 49%, Northwest and West Radio Network 52%, BBC 22%, Bavarian Network 15%, and Radio Luxembourg 9% in terms of popularity among residents of the Soviet Zone of Germany. RIAS receives 250,000 fan letters from its audience annually, and 85,000 of these letters come from residents of the Soviet Zone of Germany.

g. Achievements. RIAS achieved significant stature during the Berlin Blockade in 1948 when it sustained the morale of the beleaguered citizens, told them where to go for food and shelter, and reported Communist efforts to make life difficult for the Berliners. Since its founding, RIAS has, at the request of the listeners, broadcast descriptions of more than 55,000 missing persons. These broadcasts were much more prevalent during the period

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from 1948-1953 than today, because immediately at the end of World War II, there was a great search by Germans for missing members of their families. As a result of such broadcasts more than 5,000 reunions were effected between missing persons and their families. Such RIAS activity has helped make this radio station a significant and respected institution to its many listeners.

h. Personnel. Programs of RIAS are for the most part originated and produced by a permanent staff of about 470 Germans and 8 Americans. Additional programs come from part-time correspondents in many German and foreign cities, from West German radio stations (which make reciprocal use of RIAS programs), and from the Voice of America in Washington.

i. Provisions for Policy Control. RIAS is a major element of the United States Information Service in Germany. The Country Public Affairs Officer at the American Embassy in Bonn is responsible for the operation of RIAS, and is also responsible for the transmission of United States policy to that station. The United States Ambassador at Bonn is responsible for the application of the policy as regards the Soviet Zone of Germany, Berlin and West Germany. Policy direction at the RIAS station is maintained and controlled by the American director and his seven American USIS officers.

It is incumbent upon RIAS to explain U.S. policies and positions with precision and care, and to make certain that its tone and content are such that the U.S. Government can accept full responsibility for its programs. In fulfilling this role, it is essential that RIAS broadcasts place greatest emphasis on factual information, straight news, and intelligent commentary; on exposition of U.S. policies and on a valid delineation of the values, institutions and procedures which sustain life in the Free World.

The Director of RIAS has daily contact with the Public Affairs Officer in Bonn on major matters concerning policy. A daily classified policy guidance is transmitted from the Voice of America and this guidance clearly indicates what the policy line is on major news and commentary output for that day. The Ambassador has a final and deciding word on any matter of policy or procedure that may possibly arise in normal or emergency matters affecting RIAS and its output.

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VI. THE VOICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND

A. COMMENT BY DEPARTMENT OF STATE

In preparing these comments on the "Voice of the United Nations Command," the Department of State asked the Embassy in Seoul for its estimate of the value of VUNC activities. The general tenor of the Embassy's estimate, in which the Public Affairs Officer shared, is favorable to the role being played by VUNC, judging it to fulfill a desirable function supplementary to the Voice of America and capable of obtaining sufficient policy guidance from the Embassy.

The Department recognizes the concern of the United Nations Command with psychological warfare activities as an important means of carrying out its responsibilities for the defense of Korea against Communist aggression. We are cognizant of the valuable contributions which VUNC has made to this end and of its close cooperation with the Embassy at Seoul toward the achievement of U.S. foreign policy objectives in Korea.

Nevertheless, the Department has some reservations concerning the status and current operations of VUNC:

1. As its name implies, VUNC purports to be the voice of a United Nations instrumentality and its mission still seems to be conceived primarily as a psychological warfare operation directed toward peoples of the Far East. However, the support and direction of VUNC rest exclusively with the U. S. Armed Forces. Neither the UN per se nor our allies in the UN Command have any say in the policy determinations of VUNC broadcasting which is conducted in their name. So far as we are aware, they have not raised questions about VUNC; but it is not known whether they are familiar with its broadcast content. This is an anomalous situation which could prove embarrassing to the U.S. Government in its relations with our allies in the Korean conflict.

2. Headquarters of VUNC is in Okinawa; it also has an office in Japan and another in Korea. Evidently, it attempts to take soundings on general political and informational policy lines, at least from our mission in Seoul, and to coordinate policy decisions with our Ambassador there. But its general authority stems from and ends with the U.S. Department of Defense, and its broadcasting policies depend largely on the area command. In view of the fact that liaison is conducted with the Public Affairs Officer only in terms of general guidance and, at best, the PAO hears or sees the broadcast material after the broadcasts have been made, we are concerned that there may be inadequate policy coordination.

3. With particular reference to Korea, VUNC addresses itself ostensibly to the North Korean audience but privately regards its primary target (at

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least for the time being) as the population of the Republic of Korea. We seriously doubt that these two audiences can be influenced by an identical common approach.

4. VUNC assumes it has the task of assisting to guide (albeit discreetly) political developments in the ROK, while it sees in this the greatest opportunity it has had in years to influence developments in North Korea. We doubt that the VUNC staff is competent to handle political interpretation or that this is a proper role for an organ of the military arm identified as such, especially when it is vulnerable to charges of interference in the sovereign affairs of the ROK and might, therefore, become counterproductive. Moreover, with due regard for the readiness of our mission at Seoul (including its USIS element) to provide VUNC with guidance, its capacities to follow closely the VUNC output in Korea on political and other topics are limited; and we have no indication that Embassy-USIS guidance is being applied to the Chinese language broadcasts of VUNC -- which guidance, in any event, USIS Seoul is not qualified to give.

5. With regard to U.S. official broadcasting in its over-all pattern, it is important that a single channel of activity such as that of VUNC be adequately synchronized with other U.S. broadcast and information efforts. We do not believe that access to documents containing political and informational guidelines which happen to be available, together with advice from one or several separate missions, suffice to meet this need. In the case of VUNC there appear to be lacking (a) the means of basic policy coordination and (b) a practical mechanism for comprehensively coordinated guidance on sensitive or fast breaking developments.

With the meager information at hand on the current operations of VUNC in terms of program content, audience impact, military needs, etc. it is impossible to assess thoroughly the rationale for VUNC activities at the present time in comparison with those of VOA. We are not in a position to judge whether, in existing circumstances, there is a desirable supplementary role for psychological warfare activities by VUNC and, if so, what differentiation should be made between VUNC operations and other U.S. broadcasting activities in the same target areas. So long, however, as VUNC operations continue on their present basis, there is a problem of ensuring that one set of broadcasting activities conducted by officials of the U.S. Government, which relate to U.S. foreign affairs and foreign information policies, shall be fully consonant with those policies and coordinated as closely as possible among the agencies concerned.

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B. COMMENT BY CHIEF OF STAFF, U. S. ARMY

The Voice of the United Nations Command (VUNC) is an Army psychological warfare operation. It began its radio broadcasting in the Korean language in 1950 as the radio propaganda arm of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC)/Command-in-Chief, Far East (CINCFE). After the Chinese intervened in the Korean War, VUNC's programming was expanded to include both Mandarin and Cantonese languages. Originally, the control and operation of VUNC was vested in G-2, Far East Command (FEC) who was responsible for all strategic psychological operations. Control and operation of VUNC later was transferred to the Psychological Warfare Section, Hq Army Forces Far East, and still later to the Psychological Warfare Section, Hq Army Forces Far East/Eighth U. S. Army.

In October 1954, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed CINCFE to maintain a psychological offensive in support of the UNC's position. UNC/FEC Operating Instructions, dated 1 January 1957, outlined the responsibilities of FEC components in this regard. VUNC was one of the important Army assets involved in the maintenance of the continuing psychological offensive in support of UNC's position.

In mid-1957, the Pacific Command was expanded to include the Far East Command area, now abolished. At the same time, United States Army, Pacific (USARPAC) was likewise expanded to embrace the former Army Forces Far East, together with the Army psychological operations assets, including VUNC. USARPAC, acting on the basis of CINCPAC Instructions 003410.2, dated 26 June 1958, and CINPAC Operations Plan 70-60, has assumed the former responsibilities of Army Forces Far East to provide psychological warfare support to the United Nations Command, including the operation of VUNC.

The USARPAC agency charged with the programming and operation of VUNC is the US Army Broadcasting and Visual Activity, Pacific (USAB&VAPAC). Its headquarters is on Okinawa, and its operating detachments are in Tokyo and Seoul.

VUNC programs its broadcasts in the same three languages used during the Korean War fighting. The broadcasts must be prepared, however, with the full knowledge that the programs intended for North Korean audiences can and will be heard in South Korea, and that programs ostensibly intended for Chinese forces actually will be heard in Manchuria and North China. Approximately half of the VUNC programs contain news and commentary, prepared in Tokyo; and the remaining VUNC programs are documentaries, drama, music, and interviews with government leaders, professors and students on current affairs, all prepared on tape in Seoul or Okinawa.

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VUNC broadcasts are planned to complement USIA's Voice of America broadcasts. Since Voice of America programs include only one and a half hours in Korean, four hours in Mandarin, and three hours in Cantonese to the VUNC target area each day, VUNC broadcasts reinforce this coverage in an area of vital importance to the military commander.

Continuing efforts have been and are made to maintain VUNC and Voice of America on parallel policy axes for important issues. Approximately four hours of USIA's press wireless service are available daily to the Tokyo operating detachment for VUNC. USIA's periodic Information Guides, which are dispatched to world-wide Army commands, are sent simultaneously to CINCUSARPAC, CINCUNC, and to the three operating elements of USAB&VAPAC. In addition, the Tokyo and Seoul operating detachments maintain close liaison with the U.S. Information Service posts at the respective American embassies.

In addition to executing the general support requirements of CINCUNC as outlined in USARPAC's current Operating Instructions, VUNC programmers are prepared to and do react as required in direct support of CINCUNC to meet changing conditions and circumstances.

In short, VUNC broadcasts support USIA/UNC policies and fill a needed role in countering very aggressive North Korean propaganda.

A true measure of effectiveness of radio operations is difficult to assess. However, there are certain continuing indications that the range and content of VUNC broadcasts do cause concern in North Korea and in China. These indications are (1) North Korean defectors who agree that VUNC broadcasts are being heard in all parts of North Korea; (2) Chinese radio jamming devices that are used against VUNC transmissions; (3) texts of official replies from Chinese and North Korean propaganda broadcasts, as monitored by FBIS, that contain materials designed to refute VUNC statements and charges; and (4) Republic of Korea newspaper articles that praise VUNC for its role in keeping its listeners informed of news developments.

Only an Armistice Agreement is in effect in Korea and, based on this fact, CINCUNC is charged with the responsibility for the defense and security of the Republic of Korea. In order to discharge effectively this responsibility, it is mandatory that the Commander in Chief have adequate resources instantly available to him; VUNC is one of these highly important assets. In addition to providing current support to CINCUNC, the Voice of the United Nations Command is the Pacific Command's sole strategic radio broadcasting asset with a capability for reacting instantaneously to a developed target audience in the event of resumption of the conflict.

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C. COMMENT BY U. S. INFORMATION AGENCY

VUNC began operations during the Korean war and has continued to broadcast since then in Korean, Mandarin, and Cantonese under the general supervision of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, who commands all U.S., Korean and allied forces in the Republic of Korea (ROK). VUNC headquarters, however, are in Okinawa, and most of the news copy is currently made up in Tokyo for simultaneous broadcast from Japan and Korea. Recently, the Japanese Government has found it "politically impossible" to have VUNC continue its broadcasts from Japan over leased facilities of the Japan Broadcasting Corporation, and arrangements are underway to make up the loss by installing a new transmitter in Korea.

USIA is not, of course, in a position to comment on the military usefulness or effectiveness of VUNC. We assume that in Korea, where there is only an uncertain armistice, it fills an operational and training need which is unique to our military requirements overseas. (It is appropriate here to note that VUNC is completely financed and directed by the U.S. Government as a psywar operation designed to "weaken the political foundations" of the Chinese and Korean Communist regimes, "depress enemy morale", "weaken obedience to Communist leadership", etc., as well as to promote "understanding among those in the target group" of U.S. policies and actions. The other 15 nations which participated in the Korean war have no voice in VUNC's operating policy and make no financial contribution to it.)

There are other aspects of VUNC which are of more direct concern to us. These are:

1. The fact that the UN Command is in effect the U.S. Army and that VUNC uses USIA materials would seem to necessitate that VUNC reflect overall U.S. policy rather than something independent of this policy.

2. Although the USIA wireless file and some policy guidance which originates in the State Department are made available to VUNC, there is no assurance that this guidance is consistently followed or applied. Moreover, much of this guidance is of a long-range nature and cannot provide "the line" on fast breaking news stories. There is no practical way for USIA or VOA to provide the necessary fast news guidance for VUNC's daily programming.

The problem of fast guidance to VUNC is of particular concern to USIA. Here we have two radio stations, VOA and VUNC, known to be financed and directed by the U.S. Government, addressing themselves to foreign audiences, and yet not necessarily following the same "line". Perhaps nine times out of ten the VUNC staff will handle news and commentary as the policy makers in the Government wish it to be handled. It is that tenth time that concerns us.

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3. VUNC addresses its output in the Korean language to all Koreans, whether in North or South Korea. Since the emergency occasioned by Rhee's overthrow, the primary audience appears to have become the people of South Korea.

This must pose for VUNC's staff a number of problems. There is the implication in the broadcasts to South Koreans that the U.S. is intervening in the affairs of the sovereign Korean people. Unless these broadcasts are done with extreme discretion, an unfavorable reaction seems likely to arise sooner or later from our friends in South Korea.

4. It is somewhat surprising that none of our allies in the Korean war has raised questions about VUNC. We are speaking, we say, on their behalf and yet they have no voice in what is actually said. In the interest of allied solidarity, we should consider whether VUNC does not take some of our friends for granted.

VUNC is not seen as a competitor of VOA. VOA will continue to broadcast to Korea and the Chinese Mainland whether VUNC continues or not. Nevertheless, we have the phenomenon of two U.S. voices speaking both to the people of South Korea as well as to the people of North Korea and Communist China. The main issue as we see it is this: Does VUNC's contribution to the mission of the UN Command outweigh the concerns cited above?

It may well be that VUNC should not only continue to broadcast but should be expanded and strengthened. However, while a military need may still exist for VUNC, the nature of its operation requires a clear inter-agency understanding of the role it should play in the over-all U.S. information-propaganda-psychological program overseas.

In view of VUNC's present vulnerability as a misnamed military broadcasting unit of the U.S. Government, its future should be decided at the highest level after consideration of all pertinent factors.

D. SUMMARY

VUNC is presently a responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief of the Far East under his instructions of October, 1954, to maintain a "psychological offensive" in support of the United Nations Command position. It began operating in 1950 in the Korean language and later expanded to include

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
Mandarin and Cantonese. It is also heard in Communist China. Half of the programs are prepared in Tokyo, the others are taped in Seoul or Okinawa. Originally designed to influence North Korean audiences (and to support specifically the military objectives of the UN forces), most of its listenership is now South Korean.

The problem with respect to VUNC is to coordinate its transmissions with U.S. policy and with the line of VOA and at the same time to carry out its military support operation most effectively.

The Department of the Army reports that "continued efforts have been and are made to maintain VUNC and VOA on a parallel policy axis on important issues".

USIA states that "perhaps nine times out of ten the VUNC staff will handle news and commentary as the policy makers in the government wish it to be handled. It is that tenth time that concerns us." USIA believes that "in view of VUNC's present vulnerability as a misnamed military broadcasting unit of the U.S. Government, its future should be decided at the highest level after consideration of all pertinent factors."

An inquiry by the Department of State into the subject is not yet complete, but the Department considers that a need for sharper and more timely policy coordination does exist.



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VUNC's biggest audience is now among the people of South Korea. In the new situation since the overthrow of Syngman Rhee this fact takes on new importance. Extreme discretion is required in view of reactions which might arise over U.S. expressions on Korean affairs. At the same time, VUNC can be a most important means of U.S. influence in a fast-breaking and precarious situation in South Korea. Outside South Korea, VUNC's coverage more than reinforces VOA which broadcasts only one and a half hours each day in Korean, four in Mandarin and three in Cantonese. Since the VUNC is ostensibly a United Nations voice the implications for the positions of our Allies need also to be considered.

Whatever the military requirements for VUNC and its contribution to military strength, the U.S. is in effect represented by two voices in this critical area. The situation is one which requires clearer inter-agency understanding on the role VUNC is to play in the over-all U.S. overseas propaganda and a decision on whether it should continue to exist or should be confined to a more specifically military field.

E. RECOMMENDATIONS

That, in advance of a final report by the Sprague Committee, the Radio and Television Broadcast Policy Committee, including military representation, make a study of the problems of VUNC and VOA, including a review of broadcast content and of evidences of effectiveness; that RBPC make recommendations to NSC concerning policy consultation and guidance and the attribution of responsibilities and missions between VOA and the Department of the Army; and

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That it consider at an early date especially the need to supply "fast" guidance to VUNC, perhaps by bringing the Embassies at Seoul and Taipei, and the Consulate General at Hong Kong, more closely to bear on program guidance.

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VIII. PRIVATE AND RELIGIOUS BROADCASTING

A. PRIVATE STATIONS BROADCASTING ABROAD FROM THE U. S.

KGEL, "The Voice of Friendship", Box 887, Belmont, California, broadcasts via one 50 kw shortwave to Latin America 28 hours per week.

WRUL, 1 East 57th Street, New York 22, N.Y., broadcasts 28:30 hours per week via three 50 kw and one 20 kw shortwave transmitters, to Europe in English, Swedish and Norwegian and to Latin America in English, Portuguese and Spanish. It should be noted that U.S.I.A. underwrites 7 hours per week (3:30 hpw each in Spanish and Portuguese) of WRUL Broadcasts to Latin America. This contract will be terminated at the end of Fiscal Year 1960.

B. RELIGIOUS BROADCASTERS

Of approximately 18 Protestant missionary broadcasting stations around the world, only six are of any significance in international broadcasting. These are:

1. "La Voz de los Andes", Quito, Ecuador, broadcasting shortwave to the Americas, Europe, West Indies and South Pacific in seven languages for a total of 92 hours per week. Principle language is English (57 hpw to the Americas, South Pacific and West Indies). Voz de los Andes also broadcasts 11:30 hpw in Russian to Europe and :30 minutes per week in Ukrainian.

2. EIWA - Monrovia, Liberia, broadcasts shortwave to Liberia, West and Central Africa in English, French, Portuguese and 14 African languages, and to East Africa in Amharic and Arabic for a total of 114 hours per week (of which 67 hpw are in English and 32 hpw in African languages).

3. "Voice of Tangier", Morocco, prior to suspension of broadcasting by the Government of Morocco in 1959, broadcast via shortwave, 42 hours per week which included 3:30 hpw in Russian and 3:30 hpw in Central and East European languages. This station is now off the air, but has announced plans to relocate in Monaco to broadcast in 12 languages by June.

4. "Call of the Orient", Manila, Far East Broadcasting Company, broadcasts via shortwave "To Abroad" 123 hours per week including 7 hpw in Russian and 37 hpw in Chinese dialects. This organization also operates a service out of Okinawa for the Ryukyus Islands.

5. "Voice of Righteousness", Taiwan, broadcasts via short and medium wave 133 hours per week in Mandarin to the mainland.

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6. HLKX, Inchon, Korea, broadcasts to North Korea, China and Soviet Far East, via medium wave in English, Korean, Russian and Mandarin for 50 hours per week.

C. SUMMARY

On the basis of consultation with personnel of the agencies represented in the Committee, the Staff is of the opinion that the activity of private short and medium wave radios (other than commercial networks) broadcasting to abroad presents no particular problems and that no special machinery for coordination between these stations and U.S. official policy is necessary. The stations do not subtract from the effect of U.S. supported broadcasts. They do not materially enhance the effect, although some of them, for example, KGEI, Far East Broadcasting Company, carry unattributed VOA material which in some areas significantly extends the range and coverage of our propaganda.

Two private stations, KGEI (Manila) and WRUL (Boston) and some eighteen Protestant missionary broadcasting stations broadcast regularly. Of the latter only six are significant in international broadcasting. USIA/VOA presently contracts with WRUL to provide thirty minutes each of Spanish and Portuguese broadcasts to Latin America. It is intended to terminate this contract at the end of Fiscal Year 1960. WRUL, however, is now providing a channel for broadcasts to Cuba by Cuban "refugee groups" which are having some effect.

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IX. AMATEUR RADIO

A. USIA REPLIES TO COMMITTEE STAFF QUESTIONNAIRE

Question 1: What indication can be given of the number of amateur ("ham") radio conversations between the U.S. public and the people of the USSR? The satellites? Communist China? The underdeveloped areas? (e.g. number of "hams" in respective countries; number and duration of conversations, etc.)

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USIA Answer:

The declining sun-spot cycle should decrease the amount of time contacts may be made between the U.S. and the USSR for the next seven years or so, and then start increasing again. In the meantime, all other factors should make for more contacts when conditions permit. I would not look for the USSR government to dry up communications until after it sharply curtails travel by foreigners. The reasoning here is that the present relatively liberal travel arrangements developed several years after the Russians lifted the lid for amateur communications with the "western" world.

Question 3:

What can be said of the influence of these contacts on the opinion of foreign peoples concerning the American people and United States policies?

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USIA Answer:

Like institutional advertising, the effect is small in each instance, but cumulative and favorable, though I think only towards the people, not towards the government or its policies.

Question 4:

What value have these contacts from the intelligence point of view?

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
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USIA Answer:

Very limited, if any. Exchanges during contacts are nearly always of technical information relating to amateur radio, generally information which is available in radio publications and of no military or political value. Weather information is occasionally exchanged but very, very rarely in sufficient detail to be of serious value from an intelligence point of view. Discussions of political or economic factors between amateurs are so rare as to constitute an outstanding exception to the rule.

Question 5:

Is there at present any system for exploiting, assisting or guiding these contacts for either propaganda or intelligence purposes? What can or should be done in this regard?



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USIA Answers to both questions:

To my knowledge there is no such system at present, nor any contemplated. The possibilities of using amateur radio contacts as vehicles for propaganda have been seriously discussed at the USIA but considered impractical, at least for the present. From this point of view, a certain

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benefit accrues automatically from most contacts but only indirectly.

The Voice of America has had, for several years, a quarter-hour weekly program in the English language devoted to amateur radio and broadcast world-wide. Its popularity is great judging from a constantly large mail receipt. Although the basic program is in English, other VOA language services often translate portions of the basic program for use to their respective areas of the world on a somewhat less frequent schedule.

The Office of Private Cooperation of USIA maintains contact with the American Radio Relay League (the largest amateur radio organization, by far) within the scope of their responsibilities to support the People-to-People Program, but has no particular program developed in this connection. Tentative efforts to devise such a program not long ago brought to light the fact that, from a People-to-People aspect, American amateurs were already engaged in all possible activities of this sort quite effectively and support from the USIA was deemed unnecessary.

USIA Comment:

See USIA comment relative to VOA, above. Apart from this, no relation is known, beyond the fact that it is considered likely that radio amateurs are in a better position to listen to broadcasts from these stations because of availability of good shortwave receivers, antennas, etc.

Question 8:

Would you please furnish us with any further information or written material which you think pertinent to the foregoing queries or any reference to amateur radio activity which this Committee ought to consider including in its report.

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None pertinent.

B. SUMMARY

Estimates of the number of amateur radio operators ("hams") in the Soviet Union range from 10,000 to 100,000. The latter is the published figure and includes student amateurs and listeners not yet licensed. Possibly there are 30,000 licensed operators in the USSR as compared to 150,000 in the U.S. and 250,000 around the world. There is evidence that 100,000 conversations take place annually between amateurs in Russia and the U.S.

China is reported to have practically no amateur radio. There are perhaps 1,500 licensed operators in Poland and 2,000 in Yugoslavia. No estimates are available on other Iron Curtain countries.

The Sprague Committee staff has consulted about the use of these contacts for intelligence or propaganda purposes with the Department of

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State, CIA, VOA, and, through the latter, the American Radio Relay League.

USIA reports that the "possibility of using amateur radio contacts as vehicles for propaganda has been seriously discussed at USIA but considered impractical, at least for the present."

The effect of such contacts on foreign opinion concerning the U.S. is considered slight. "Like institutional advertising", says USIA, "the effect is small in each instance but cumulative and favorable" in its influence on individuals rather than on government or policies.

VOA has for years operated a very popular quarter hour weekly program in the English language devoted to amateur radio interests and broadcasts world-wide.

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X. INTERNATIONAL TELEVISION

A. BACKGROUND

1960 marks a turning point in the development of television. Up to now, television has been introduced and has expanded most rapidly in highly-developed countries where entertainment has been the primary mission.

Now, however, television will spread to an important group of less-developed and newly-independent countries. At least 12 of these may be expected to inaugurate television broadcasting in Fiscal Year 1961 and 20 or so probably will do so in Fiscal Year 1962. Within a few years nearly all countries will have television. In the great majority, programming and transmission will be controlled by government.

None of these countries has the resources for a successful television service in programming, management, or engineering, but for status reasons -- if nothing else -- they are determined to have it whether they can support it or not.

The type of audience and the needs of the people in these countries will result in a heavy emphasis on conveying basic information and instruction in hygiene, food production, mechanical skills, community improvement, etc., to people who are largely illiterate. Entertainment and cultural programs will be regarded as much less important.

In short, television in the less-developed countries will become an important tool in teaching. For that purpose, television is effective,

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cheap, and adapted to their geographical conditions. It reaches out over jungles, rivers, and impassable roads. It multiplies ten thousandfold the utility of each instructor. It allows demonstration of basic techniques to a mass audience in a way that would otherwise be impossible except to very small groups. However, the skill and know-how for doing this cannot be found at present in these countries. They must turn elsewhere for help, and at the present time the United States is uniquely equipped to provide such help on a broad scale. The Soviet Union is far behind the United States in experience in teaching by television.

A second basic aspect of the television situation is that we are standing on the threshold of another major technological break-through. It can be assumed that regular intercontinental television will be a fact within five years -- perhaps less -- and that within ten years "global TV" will provide instantaneous audio and visual communication between the most distant countries of the world. Technologically speaking, the necessary components to achieve this now exists. The successful launching of Echo I, and its use in experimental cross-country television, is dramatic evidence of this.

B. AVAILABLE ASSETS

In respect to the development of educational television in less-developed countries the United States has important assets actually and potentially available. Private foundations and educational institutions have put the United States far in the lead in this field through a number of major experiments.

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Within the government, the television service of the U.S. Information Agency has developed valuable experience, particularly in giving programming assistance to foreign television services.

The International Cooperation Administration, under the terms of its mission, can supply equipment to foreign governments for television purposes. ICA also is able to provide specialists to give on-the-spot guidance and can bring foreign technicians to the United States for training.

The State Department Specialist Branch can send American experts abroad for periods up to one year; and the Department's Leader Grant Program can bring foreign specialists to the United States for periods of study.

In principle, the Development Loan Fund is not barred from financing television systems overseas.

These potential resources, however, are not being used effectively. Here, then, may be an area in which the United States, if it moves quickly and with imagination, can do much to gain great credit for itself while at the same time promoting stability and growth in less-developed countries, all at relatively minor cost.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Because of the important new educational and informational possibilities of television there is need for a coordinated government-wide policy to define the United States interest in the future overseas expansion of the medium. Responsibility for this might well be assigned to the Radio-Television Broadcast Policy Committee.

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2. It is desirable that a working group be established -- perhaps under the Operations Coordinating Board -- to insure the effective utilization of available resources in support of a central policy.

3. Thought should be given to the development of more effective means of cooperation between private and governmental agencies interested in educational and international television. The continued active effort of foundations and educational institutions in this field is of the greatest importance. Also, the adequacy of present U.S. facilities for the training of foreign nationals in programming and technical aspects of television needs to be reviewed.

4. The prospect of intercontinental television in the next few years requires that attention be given now to a number of the technical, legal, and other problems which will arise:

a. An international agreement on video channels and audio frequencies will be required, if a chaotic situation is to be avoided.

b. Determination will have to be made of the role of USIA and of private companies in the broadcasting of intercontinental programs.

c. The possibility of a joint venture with friendly governments in putting communications satellites into space has been suggested. Clear policy and careful plans will be required if such a cooperative effort with any foreign country is to be carried out.

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